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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
* * * 
UTAH CONSTITUTION 
1) Utah Const. Art. I § 24 [Uniform operation of laws] 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation. 
2) Utah Const. Art I § 11,(1896) [Courts open-Redress of 
injuries] 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to 
him in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by 
due course of law, which shall be administered without denial or 
unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from 
prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this State, by 
himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party. 
3) Utah Const. Art XVI § 5, (1896) [Injuries resulting in death-
Damages] 
The right of action to recover damages for injuries resulting in 
death, shall never be abrogated, and the amount recoverable shall 
not be subject to any statutory limitation, except in cases where 
compensation for injuries resulting in death is provided for by law. 
STATUTES 
1) Lord Campbell's Act- Comp. Laws Territory of Utah 1874; 2 
Comp.l888§2961. 
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, 
neglect or default, and the act, neglect or default is such as would, 
IV 
if the death had not ensued, have entitled the party injured to 
maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof, then, 
and in every such case, the person who, or the company or 
corporation which would have been liable if death had not ensued, 
shall be liable to an action for damages, notwithstanding the 
death of the person injured, and although the death shall have 
been caused under such circumstances as amount to law to felony. 
2) Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-301 et. seq.(2007). Waivers of 
immunity—Exceptions 
(4) Immunity from suit of each governmental entity is waived as 
to any injury proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of 
an employee committed within the scope of employment. 
(5) Immunity from suit of each governmental entity is not waived 
under Subsections (3) and (4) if the injury arises out of, in 
connection with, or results from: 
* * * 
(j) the incarceration of any person in any state prison, county 
or city jail, or other place of legal confinement; 
3) Utah Code Ann. § 62A-2-101, et seq. (2007). Licensure of 
Programs and Facilities 
U.C.A. 62-2-101 Definitions 
(12) 'Human services licensee' or 'licensee' means a youth 
program, resource family home, or a facility or program, 
licensed by the department, that provides care, secure 
treatment, inpatient treatment, residential treatment, 
residential support, adult day care, outpatient treatment, 
domestic violence treatment, child placing services, or social 
detoxification. 
v 
U.C.A. § 62A-2-101(12)(2007). 
4) Utah Code Ann.§ 62A-7-101. (2007) Def in i t ions 
(3) "Community-based program" means a nonsecure residential or 
nonresidential program designated to supervise and rehabilitate 
youth offenders in the least restrictive setting, consistent with 
public safety, and designated or operated by or under contract 
with the division. 
(20) "Secure facility" means any facility operated by or under 
contract with the division, that provides 24-hour supervision and 
confinement for youth offenders committed to the division for 
custody and rehabilitation 
(26) "Youth offender" means a person 12 years of age or older, and 
who has not reached 21 years of age, committed or admitted by 
the juvenile court to the custody, care, and jurisdiction of the 
division, for confinement in a secure facility or supervision in the 
community, following adjudication for a delinquent act which 
would constitute a felony or misdemeanor if committed by an 
adult. 
5) Utah Code Ann § 62A-7-104(8) Division's Responsibi l i t ies 
(8) In any order committing a youth offender to the division, the 
juvenile court shall specify whether the youth offender is being 
committed for secure confinement or placement in a community-
based program. The division shall place the youth offender in the 
most appropriate program within the category specified by the 
court. 
VI 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Issue #1 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit's 
Certification of Question of State Law: Is a juvenile delinquent 
place in a community-based proctor home incarcerated in a place 
of legal confinement, such that Utah has not waived its state 
sovereign immunity for injuries arising our of, in connection with, 
or resulting from his placement, pursuant to the Governmental 
Immunity Act of Utah, Utah Code § 63G-7-301(5)(j)? 
Utah Code § 63G-7-301(5)(j) gives immunity to the State for a 
person who is incarcerated in a place of legal confinement. The 
Juvenile's courts authority to place a child in the custody of the state 
comes from Utah's Youth Offenders Act, Utah Code Ann.§ 62A-7-101, et 
seq. It is the Youth Offenders Act that determines if a child in state 
custody is incarcerated or to be placed in a community based program. 
The Utah District Court correctly analyzed the Youth Offenders Act and 
Utah's case law to determine that Dillon was not incarcerated in a place 
of legal confinement. Specifically citing Utah law, "The Court of 
Appeals of Utah has stated that to incarcerate "is to imprison or to 
confine" Pace v. St. George City Police Dept. 2006 UT App. 494 ^ 6, 153 
P.3d 789, 790 (2006). In setting forth the laws pertaining to Juvenile 
Justice Services, the Utah legislature set forth that youth offenders are 
1 
either placed in "confinement in a secure facility or supervised in the 
community." Utah Code Ann.§ 62A-7-101(26) (2006 & Supp. 2008) 
(emphasis added). A "secure facility" means any facility operated by or 
under contract with the division, that provides 24-hour supervision and 
confinement for youth offenders committed to the division for custody 
and rehabilitation. Id. § 62A-7-101(20). In contrast, a "community-
based program" as defined by the legislature, "means a non-secure 
residential or nonresidential program designed to supervise and 
rehabilitate youth offenders in the least restrictive setting, consistent 
with public safety, and design or operated by or under contract with the 
division." Id. § 62A-7-101(3). 
Here, the juvenile court judge specifically chose not to confine 
Dillon in a secure facility but to place him in a community-based 
program, where he would be supervised and rehabilitated "in the least 
restrictive setting, consistent with public safety." Id. As the facts 
demonstrated Dillon was under little to no supervision from the State, 
which had no contact with Dillon for months, or the proctor home, 
which let Dillon come and go freely around the community as he 
2 
pleased. The District Court therefore correctly determined that Dillon 
Whitney was not "incarcerated" in a "place of legal confinement." 
If the Supreme Court of Utah certifies the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals question of State Law in the affirmative; by finding children in 
proctor care are incarcerated pursuant to Utah Code § 63G-7-301(5)(j) 
the GIA would violate Utah Constitution's, Art. I § 24 "Uniform 
Operation of Laws;" Art I § 11 "Open Courts Claus;" and Art. XVI § 5 
"Wrongful Death Clause." These issues were preserved for the Tenth 
Circuit and presented in the Brief of Appellee's at the Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals pages 15-23. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This Certification of State Law is based on the State's Motion to 
Dismiss for failure to state a claim based upon the Governmental 
Immunity Act, Incarceration Exception to the Negligence Waiver. The 
State lost the motion at the District Court, which determined a child in 
a proctor home was not incarcerated in a legal place of confinement. 
The State of Utah defendants appealed the District Courts order to the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. The State was 
entitled to the Appeal as a right based upon the Governmental 
3 
Immunity Act. The arguments were fully briefed and argued at the 
United State Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. The Tenth Circuit 
certified a question of State law to the Supreme Court of Utah and on 
January 19, 2011 this Court accepted the certified question of state law. 
STATEMENT FACTS 
In early 2007 the honorable Andrew Valdez placed Dillon on 
probation and within the care and custody of Division of Juvenile 
Justice Services (DJJS) for placement in a diversion program. 
Appellee's Correct Brief, U.S. Court App. 10th Circ. p. 8. DJJS placed 
Dillon in a wilderness diversion program at Journey Ranch. Id. 
On June 9, 2007 Dillon was "terminated" from Journey and placed 
in custody at the Salt Lake Valley Detention Center ("SLVDC"). Id. On 
June 22, 2007 Dillon was "released" from the SLVDC and placed in the 
Observation & Assessment program ("O&A"). Id. On August 15, 2007, 
Judge Valdez, terminated Dillon's previous order regarding his 
placement at the Observation & Assessment facility and ordered the 
Division of Juvenile Justice Services ("DJJS") to place Dillon in a secure 
and safe community-based placement. Id. The order specifically states, 
"the minor's removal from the home and placement with the Division of 
4 
Juvenile Justice Services is in the best interest of the minor." Id. DJJS 
placed Dillon in a proctor home where Dillon was provided a basement 
mother-in-law apartment with another proctor child. Id at p.6. The 
proctor children had access to and used an unmonitored unguarded 
basement side entrance and exit. Id at pp6-7. Dillon was allowed to 
come and go at-will. Id at p. 7. While at the proctor home the State 
through DJJS lost track of Dillon. Id. 
On three separate occasions in early Sept. 2007, Dillon's State 
caseworker, Huy Nguyen, was unsuccessful in attempting to locate 
Dillon. Id. Dillon's proctor home informed Nguyen that it was hard to 
"get hold of [Dillon] after school." Id. Nguyen left the Division and as a 
result he never again made contact with Dillon. Id. Dillon was without 
a caseworker for a month. Id. On October 30, 2007, two months after 
Nguyen left, Dillon met his new caseworker, Kyle Lancaster. Id. Dillon 
met with caseworker Lancaster on only one other occasion. Id. On 
Thanksgiving Day November 22, 2007, Dillon went on an approved 
home visit to his father's house. Id. On Friday Dillon failed to return to 
his proctor home, apparently he snuck in the basement door changed 
clothes and left again. Id. Dillon's proctor parent called and informed 
5 
the tracker at the agency of Dillon's absence. Id. The tracker was 
spending the weekend in St George. Id. The tracker placed a single 
unanswered phone call in an attempt to locate Dillon. Id at p. 8. 
On November 23, 2007 Dillon went to the home of Victor 
Hernandez. Id. On November 24, 2007 Dillon fell down a flight of 
seventeen stairs. Id. Afterwards Dillon was placed on the couch in Mr. 
Hernandez apartment. Id. On November 25, 2007 Mr. Hernandez 
fearing Dillon had died, placed him outside on the steps. Id. Neighbors 
notified paramedics, who transported Dillon to Salt Lake Regional 
Hospital. Id. On November 25 at 7:00 a.m. en-route to the hospital 
Dillon Whitney died; three days after Dillon was first noticed missing 
and fifteen hours after he fell down the stairs. Id. 
For three days Dillon was missing, no one from the State of Utah, 
the proctor home or the agency was searching for him. Id. Nor for the 
three days Dillon was missing did any one from the State of Utah, D JJS 
or Quest reported Dillon missing to any authority who could locate him 
as required by Utah Law U.C.A. §62A-7-104(10)(a). Id. Dillon was in a 
proctor home that allowed him to violate the laws of the State of Utah, 
6 
the Court's order, and the policy and procedures of the Division of 
Juvenile Justice Services. Id. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
First, Dillon Whitney was not "incarcerated" in a "place of legal 
confinement" at the time of his death. The United States District Court 
For the District of Utah correctly interpreted Utah's Youth Corrections' 
Act's (U.C.A. § 63A-7-101 et seq.) by determining Dillon's placement out 
in the community did not qualify as incarceration in a place of legal 
confinement. 
The Youth Correction's Act gives the statutory authority of the 
juvenile justice court to both confine and incarcerate a child or to place 
the child in the community. In particular the act provides the juvenile 
justice court judge the discretion to place a juvenile offender in either a 
place of "confinement in a secure facility or supervision in the 
community." U.C.A.§ 62A-7-101(26)(2006 & Supp. 2008)(Emphasis 
added). Utah Courts have defined incarcerate "is to imprison or 
confine." The Act defines "secure facility" means any facility operated 
by or under contract with the division, that provides 24-hour 
supervision and confinement for youth offenders committed to the 
7 
division for custody and rehabilitation. Id. § 62A-7-101(20). In contrast 
a "community-based program" as defined by the legislature, "means a 
non-secure residential or nonresidential program designed to supervise 
and rehabilitate youth offenders in the least restrictive setting, 
consistent with public safety, and designated or operated by or under 
contract with the division." Id. § 62A-7-101(3). The District Court 
correctly interpreted the Act's definition and found: 
Here, the juvenile court judge specifically chose not to 
confine Dillon to a secure facility but to place him in a 
community-based program, where he would be supervised 
and rehabilitated "in the least restrictive setting, consistent 
with public safety." Id. the court cannot conclude that Dillon 
was "incarcerated" in a place of "legal confinement" for 
purposes of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
Therefore, the State Defendants are not entitled to 
immunity under the incarceration exception to the waiver of 
governmental immunity for negligence. 
Second, to extend the definition of an incarcerated person in a 
place of legal confinement to include a proctor child is to extend the 
definition of a place of legal confinement to include the entire 
community. Dillon was free to wander the community without any 
restrictions on any locations. His only restrictions set by the juvenile 
court was whom he could have contact with, yet even these restrictions 
were ignored by the State and by his proctor parent. 
8 
Third, this is a question of state law to determine if a child in 
proctor home is incarcerated, yet the State cannot escape liability if a 
child in a proctor home is considered incarcerated without violating 
Utah's Constitution. In particular if Dillon was considered "incarcerated 
in a legal place of confinement/' the incarceration exception as applied 
to Dillon Whitney would be unconstitutional pursuant to the "uniform 
operations of law clause/' "open courts clause/' and the "wrongful death 
clause." 
What is critical in a "uniform operation of laws" constitutional 
analysis is that the operation of the law be uniform. A law does not 
operate uniformly if "persons similarly situated" are not "treated 
similarly" or if "persons in different circumstances" are "treated as if 
their circumstances were the same." In 1983 the Supreme Court of 
Utah determined that a child in foster care could sue for his/her 
negligent placement. The statute that regulates a foster home is the 
same statute that regulates a proctor home. Therefore a proctor child 
or his/her parents should be given the same rights to recover for the 
States negligence as a foster child or his/her parents who is placed in 
the same home under the same conditions and situations. 
9 
In an "open courts clause" analysis the courts look to see if a 
statute as applied to a particular situation abrogates a right that 
existed when the act was created. In this case, the State of Utah has 
recognized that negligent placement of children outside their homes are 
valid common law causes of action against the state, as such, if applied 
to Ms. Whitney it would abrogate her rights for a cause of action 
against the State for the negligent placement of her child, Dillon. 
Unlike the "open courts clause" the "wrongful death clause" is 
violated when a statute violates a cause of action for wrongful death 
that existed at the time the constitution was adopted. The Supreme 
Court of Utah in Tiede v. State of Utah 915 P.2d 500 (Utah 1986) entire 
premise was based upon the erroneous assumption that when Utah's 
constitution was adopted the State could not be sued for wrongful 
death. This is plainly wrong, when three years prior to adoption of the 
constitution, Utah adopted Lord Campbell's act (a survivor statute) 
allowing negligence actions to survive a person's death. Since the State 
could be sued for negligence at the adoption of its constitution it could 
be sued for wrongful death. 
10 
ARGUMENT 
Appellate courts apply a three-part test to determine whether a 
governmental entity is immune from suit under the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act, and the test assesses, (1) whether the activity taken is a 
governmental function; (2) whether the governmental immunity was 
waived for the particular activity; (3) whether there is an exception to 
that waiver. Peck v. State, 2008 UT 39, | 8 , 191 P.3d 4, 7. In this case it 
is undisputed that placement of children in foster and/or proctor care is 
a governmental function and it is undisputed that the government 
waived its immunity for negligence. 
The only issue is whether or not an exception exists for the 
waiver. The State claims the incarceration exception applied and that 
Dillon Whitney was incarcerated in a place legal confinement. The 
Utah District Court determined that Dillon Whitney, who was in a 
proctor home and free to come and go as he pleased, did not fit the 
definition of a person "incarcerated" in a "place of legal confinement." 
The State Appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit certified 
the following question of state law to this Court to determine: 
Is a juvenile delinquent placed in a community-based proctor 
home incarcerated in a place of legal confinement, such that 
11 
Utah has not waived its state sovereign immunity for 
injuries arising out of, in connection with, or resulting from 
his placement, pursuant to the Governmental Immunity Act 
of Utah, Utah Code § 63G-7-301(5)0'). 
First, Dillon Whitney was not incarcerated in a place of legal 
confinement by its very definition. To be incarceration the person must 
be restricted in his movements, yet Dillon was permitted to go to any 
place that was legal for any other sixteen-year-old child. Dillon was 
merely restricted on who he was allowed to visit. Second, extending the 
definition of incarceration in a legal place of confinement to include 
children in proctor homes who have free run of the community would 
make the term legal place of confinement meaningless. Third, a finding 
that a child in a proctor home is incarcerated and the Government has 
not waived its immunity would violate Utah Constitution's, Equal 
Protection Clause, Open Courts Clause and Wrongful Death Clause. 
I) THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY INTERPRETED THE 
YOUTH CORRECTIONS ACT TO DETERMINE THAT DILLON 
WAS NOT "INCARCERATED" IN A "PLACE OF LEGAL 
CONFINEMENT." 
The district courts analysis correctly revolved around the 
statutory issue as to whether or not Dillon Whitney's ("Dillon") 
placement in a community setting would be considered incarcerated in 
12 
a place of legal confinement. When interpreting a statute a court begins 
with the plain language. Grappendorf v. Pleasant Grove City, 2007 UT 
84, Tf 9, 173 P.3d 166, 168 (Utah 2007). In conducting a textual analysis 
when interpreting a statute, a court must consider the literal meaning 
of each term and avoid interpretations that will render portions of a 
statute superfluous or inoperative. Id. Utah's Governmental Immunity 
Act (UGIA) provides immunity to the State if a person is injured 
negligently when "incarcerated" in a "place of legal confinement." Utah 
Code Ann. § 63G-7-301(5)G)(West Supp. 2009). Utah's Youth 
Corrections Act provides discretion to the juvenile justice judge to either 
place the youth offender in a "secure confinement or placement in a 
community-based placement." Utah Code Ann. § 62A-7-104(8)(2006) 
(emphasis added),1 Utah's Youth Corrections Act defines a 
"'[cjommunity-based program' [as] a nonsecure residential or 
nonresidential program designated to supervise and rehabilitate youth 
offenders in the least restrictive setting..." Id at §62A-7-101(4). In 
contrast, the Appellate Court of Utah defined "incarcerate is to 
imprison or to confine." Pace v. St. George City Police Dept. 2006 UT 
1
 In 2008 this same statutory requirement is found in U.C.A § 62A-7-
104(4)(Supp. 2008) 
13 
App 494, ^ 6, 153 P.3d 789, 790 (Utah App 2006). "Confinement is 
generally understood as the act of imprisoning or restraining someone." 
Id. In this case, the juvenile justice court and DJJS chose to place 
Dillon in a non-secure residential community-based proctor home 
placement, where Dillon was free to travel around the community. 
The Honorable Dale Kimball at the District Court of Utah 
accurately analyzed Utah's Youth Offenders Act, Utah Code Ann.§ 62A-
7-101, et seq. and Utah's case law and correctly determined Dillon was 
not incarcerated in a place of legal confinement, specifically finding: 
The Court of Appeals of Utah has stated that to incarcerate 
"is to imprison or to confine." Pace u. St George City Police 
Dept. 2006 UT App 494 1f 6, 153 P.3d 789, 790. (2006). In 
setting forth the laws pertaining to Juvenile Justice 
Services, the Utah legislature set forth that youth offenders 
are either placed in "confinement in a secure facility or 
supervised in the community." Utah Code Ann.§ 62A-7-
101(26) (2006 & Supp. 2008) (emphasis added) A "secure 
facility" means any facility operated by or under contract 
with the division, that provides 24-hour supervision and 
confinement for youth offenders committed to the division 
for custody and rehabilitation. Id. § 62A-7-101(20). In 
contrast, a "community-based program" as defined by the 
legislature, "means a nonsecure residential or nonresidential 
program designed to supervise and rehabilitate youth 
offenders in the least restrictive setting, consistent with 
public safety, and design or operated by or under contract 
with the division." Id. § 62A-7-101(3). 
14 
Here, the juvenile court judge specifically chose not to 
confine Dillon in a secure facility but to place him in a 
community-based program, where he would be supervised 
and rehabilitated "in the least restrictive setting, consistent 
with public safety." Id. The court cannot conclude that 
Dillon was "incarcerated" in a place of "legal confinement" 
for purposes of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
Therefore, the State Defendants are not entitled to 
immunity under the incarceration exception to the waiver of 
governmental immunity for negligence. 
Aplt App. 136, Dist. Ct. Order, P.9. 
It is undisputed that Dillon had his own exit and entrance to his 
mother-in-law apartment, that he was permitted to go to school, to play 
with friends after school, and free to come and go as he pleased. Dillon 
was just not incarcerated in a legal place of confinement. 
II) THE COMMUNITY AT LARGE IS NOT A PLACE OF LEGAL 
CONFINEMENT. 
To extend the definition of an incarcerated person in a place of 
legal confinement to include a proctor child is to extend the definition of 
a place of legal confinement to include the entire community. A child 
who is free2 to wander the community at large cannot by its very 
definition be incarcerated. In every instance where the Utah appellate 
courts have interpreted the incarceration exception to negligence, "it 
The antonym of incarceration is freedom. 
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arose out of, in connection with, or resulted from" a person who was in 
jail, on his way to jail, escaped from jail, or was confined to some 
institution or some physical location. Where the State was immune 
from suit pursuant to the incarceration exception, not one person had 
the freedom to come and go from the facility or location where they were 
held. Specifically in Emery v. State, a voluntary in-patient was 
considered incarcerated because she was required to wait for 24-hours 
to leave the facility after she formally applied to leave the state 
hospital. 483 P.2d 1296, 1297 (Utah 1971). In Epting v. State, an 
"incarcerated" prisoner was on a "work release" program that was 
transported, monitored, and controlled each day at the prison, at his 
work site and while traveling in-between each location. 546 P.2d 242, 
243 (Utah 1976). In Kirk v. State, an "incarcerated" prisoner escaped 
while being escorted to the courthouse by sheriffs. 784 P.2d 1255, 1257 
(Utah 1989). In Peck v. State, an "incarcerated" handcuffed person 
confined to a spot of ground fell forward while in front of the police 
cruiser. 2008 UT 39 f 3, 191 P.3d 4, 6 (Utah 2008). In Pace v. St George 
City Police Dep't, the incarcerated person was not permitted to leave a 
police station even though he was not formally booked into the jail. 153 
16 
P.3d 789, 790 (Utah Ct. App. 2006). In Madsen v. State, an inmate was 
considered incarcerated who died after he had surgery performed at the 
prison. 583 P.2d 92, 92 (Utah 1978). All these cases demonstrate that 
an incarcerated person be restricted from leaving a certain place. 
In contrast, sixteen-year-old-Dillon was free to wander the 
community at will without any additional restrictions3 placed upon him 
by the legislature, the courts or the state. The Youth Correction Act 
does not limit a child in a community-based place to any one location. 
The only restrictions placed on Dillon were by the court that limited 
whom he could have contacted with, yet the court did not prevent him 
from any other places in the community. The State workers did not 
limit where Dillon could go and the proctor parent allowed Dillon to do 
anything he chose and even went beyond by simply ignoring the Court's 
no contact order4. In fact, Dillon was free to come and go from his 
proctor's house. Dillon had his own unmonitored entrance/exit to the 
3
 The State restricts any sixteen-year-old child by curfews, and places 
such as bars etc. These children certainly could not be considered 
incarcerated in a legal place of confinement any more then could Dillon. 
4
 If a person had a restraining order against them, and they happen to 
fall down a flight of stairs negligently constructed by the city, the city 
would certainly not be immune from suit based upon the incarceration 
exception, 
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proctor's home. Dillon's location was not known during the day, and by 
all indications was not even monitored at night. In fact during the day 
it was expected that he would go around the community as he was given 
an unlimited bus pass. 
The State's caseworkers did not get concerned when they were 
unable to locate Dillon on multiple occasions, since it was expected that 
he would be out in the community. As plead in the complaint and the 
record clearly demonstrate: DJJS and the proctor could not locate Dillon 
on at least three separate occasions, noting "it was hard to get hold of 
him [Dillon] after school." This caseworker moved to St. George and 
never did see Dillon again. Dillon remained without a caseworker for 
over a month and another month passes before Dillon was introduced to 
his new caseworker. When Dillon disappeared before his death, the 
proctor agency, the proctor parent, and DJJS made little attempt5 to 
locate him. Sadly, Dillon was missing for three days before he died and 
no one was searching for him. 
The State, the Youth Corrections Act and Dillon's proctor parents 
permitted Dillon to wander the community at will. The State 
5
 The agency made one unsuccessful phone call on Friday before giving 
up on locating Dillon. 
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caseworkers, the proctor agency and the proctor parent did not monitor 
Dillon's location at any time. Dillon was also allowed to wander the 
streets at night as his proctor parent permitted, his case workers knew 
of, and in violation of curfew laws that supervise all children. 
Ill) ANSWERING THE TENTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS' 
CERTIFIED QUESTION OF STATE LAW IN THE 
AFFIRMATIVE WOULD VIOLATE UTAH'S CONSTITUTION. 
If a child in a proctor home were considered incarcerated in a 
place of legal confinement, the Governmental Immunity act would 
violate Utah's Constitution's: Art. 1 § 24, "Uniform Operation of Laws 
Clause;" Art I § 11, "Open Courts Clause;" and Art XVI § 5, the 
"Wrongful Death Clause." 
a) "Uniform Operation of Laws" 
The Utah State Constitution provides: "All laws of a general 
nature shall have a uniform operation." UTAH CONST, art. I, § 24 (1896). 
Uniform Operation of Laws is violated where a child in foster care 
is permitted to Yecover from the state for negligent placement, yet a 
child in proctor care in a home with the exact same requirements could 
not recover for the state's negligent placement. 
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"For a law to be constitutional under Article I, section 24, it is not 
enough that it be uniform on its face. What is critical is that the 
operation of the law be uniform. A law does not operate uniformly if 
"persons similarly situated" are not "treated similarly" or if "persons in 
different circumstances" are "treated as if their circumstances were the 
same." Lee v. Gaufin 867 P.2d 572, (Utah 1993). 
This Court held that the State of Utah, or specifically the Division 
of Family Services, as a placement agency, could be held liable for its 
failure "to properly evaluate the foster home, its failure to supervise 
[the child's] placement and its failure to protect her from harm." Little 
v. Division of Family Services, 677 P.2d 49, 50-52 (Utah 1983). 
The statutory authority to license, investigate and monitor a 
foster home and a proctor home are provided in the "Licensure of 
Programs and Facilities" act U.C.A. § 62A-2-101 et seq. There is no 
distinction in the act as to how a foster home is licensed, inspected or 
investigated. The licensing board lumps all youth programs in one 
definition, specifically: 
'Human services licensee' or 'licensee' means a youth 
program, resource family home, or a facility or program, 
licensed by the department, that provides care, secure 
treatment, inpatient treatment, residential treatment, 
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residential support, adult day care, outpatient treatment, 
domestic violence treatment, child placing services, or social 
detoxification. 
U.C.A. § 62A-2-101(12)(2007). 
The licensing board responsibilities are to approve, deny, suspend, 
and revoke licenses, for human services licensees and facilities are 
required to protect the basic health and safety of clients and to enforce 
the rules. U.C.A § 62A-2-105 and 106. There are no distinctions 
between a client who is sent to a facility as a proctor child or as a foster 
child. Therefore to allow foster child to recover from the state for its 
negligent placement yet deny a proctor child placed in the exact same 
home with the exact same requirements of compliance would violate 
Utah's Constitutional Uniform Operations of Law Clause. 
b) Open Courts Clause. 
The Utah State Constitution provides: 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury 
done to him in his person, property or reputation, shall 
have remedy by due course of law, which shall be 
administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and 
no person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending 
before any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, 
any civil cause to which he is a party. 
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UTAH CONST, art. I, § 11. This provision, known as the "Open Courts 
Clause," guarantees parties an access to a judicial forum in which their 
petitions for redress may be heard. The Utah Supreme Court has 
adopted a two-pronged test to determine whether legislation runs afoul 
of the Open Courts Clause. See Berry ex rel Berry v. Beechcraft Aircraft 
Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 680 (Utah 1985). 
Under the Berry test, a law that abrogates a common law remedy 
or cause of action is constitutional only if it meets one of two 
requirements: 1) the law abrogating the remedy also provides an 
injured person an effective and reasonable alternative remedy; or 2) 
there is a clear social or economic evil to be eliminated, and the 
elimination of the existing legal remedy is not an arbitrary or 
unreasonable means for achieving the objective. Id.; see also Laney v. 
Fairview City, 2002 UT 79, % 1f 49-55; 57 P.3d 1007, 1021-1023 (finding 
the Act violated the Open Courts Clause when the Appellant right to 
sue the government for a proprietary function was abrogated) 
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The application of the Act abrogated Whitney's claims against the 
governmental defendants.6 In general, Utah courts have recognized 
negligence actions against governmental entities since prior to 
statehood. See Levy v. Salt Lake City, 1 P. 160, 162 (Utah 1881). More 
specifically, Utah Courts have recognized common law negligent 
supervision and placement actions against governmental entities. Little 
v. Utah State Div. of Family Servs., 667 P.2d 49, 54-55 (Utah 1983). 
UGIA abrogates Whitney's claims in the following respect: expanding 
the definition of "incarceration" to include the circumstances of the 
instant case has, in essence, abrogated any cause of action that results 
in a child's physical injury against a governmental entity. In this case 
if the court adopts the State's broad definition of incarceration, parents 
of the children removed from their homes would lose their common law 
right to sue for injuries sustained for the negligent placement of 
children in those homes. 
6
 More specifically, the 1987 amendments to the Governmental 
Immunity Act, which included the laundry list of exceptions to the 
original 1965 Act's waiver, abrogated Ms. Whitneys' claims. See 
generally UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-1 et seq. (1953 as amended 1966); cf. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-10 et seq. (1986 & Supp. 1989). 
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Moreover, the Governmental Immunity Act provides no 
alternative remedy for Whitney in this case. Under the defendant's 
application of the Governmental Immunity Act, Whitney negligence 
claims are simply foreclosed, and she is suffered to bear the costs of the 
State's and its employees' negligence. And the act itself states no "clear 
social or economic evil" to be eliminated by closing the doors of the 
courts on injured parties, such as Whitney. 
c) Wrongful Death Guarantee Clause. 
The Governmental Immunity Act, as applied to Whitney's claims 
for the wrongful death of their child, violated their constitutional right 
to assert a wrongful death claim. 
The Utah State Constitution provides: 
The right of action to recover damages for injuries resulting 
in death, shall never be abrogated, and the amount 
recoverable shall not be subject to any statutory limitation, 
except in cases where compensation for injuries resulting in 
death is provided for by law. 
UTAH STATE CONST., art. XVI, § 5 (1896). 
The Supreme Court of Utah has held that, where the Constitution 
clearly prohibits the Legislature from abrogating a "right to action," it is 
necessary to determine what the right was and who enjoyed it—at the 
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time the Constitution was adopted. Tiede v. State of Utah, 915 P.2d 
500, 503 (Utah 1986). 
The Supreme Court erred in Tiede in concluding that the 
government was immune from suit for wrongful death at the time the 
Utah Constitution was adopted. In fact, actions for wrongful death 
were recognized prior to the adoption of the Utah Constitution. 
Accordingly, the legislature did, in fact, abrogate an existing right of 
action when it enacted the Governmental Immunity Act, in violation of 
Article XVI, § 5 of the Utah Constitution. Id. at 504. 
The Supreme Court of Utah will overturn precedent if convinced it 
is clear that the rule was originally erroneous. Laney, 2002 UT 79, 45. 
It should do so in the instant case. 
The Supreme Court may not have been provided with accurate 
historical information in 1986 when Tiede was decided and the Supreme 
Court held that no cause of action existed for wrongful death against 
the government when Utah adopted its constitution. 915 P.2d at 504. 
Instead, the Supreme Court in Tiede relied on a procedural statute that 
was enacted in 1896 in concluding that a claim for wrongful death did 
not exist at the time of the adoption of the constitution. Id. (See 1898 
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Revised Statutes of Utah § 929)7. Id. According to Tiede, the Act on 
which the Supreme Court based its determination that there was no 
cause of action for wrongful death was enacted a year after the 
constitution was adopted. Id. 
In fact, as early as 1874 and through 1898, Utah had in effect a 
wrongful death statute, known as "Lord Campbell's Act" or "An Act 
providing damages for death caused by wrongful act, negligent or 
default." That statute provided: 
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by 
wrongful act, neglect or default, and the act, neglect or 
default is such as would, if the death had not ensued, 
have entitled the party injured to maintain an action 
and recover damages in respect thereof, then, and in 
every such case, the person who, or the company or 
corporation which would have been liable if death had 
not ensued, shall be liable to an action for damages, 
notwithstanding the death of the person injured, and 
although the death shall have been caused under such 
circumstances as amount to law to felony, (emphasis 
added). 
Comp. Laws Territory of Utah 1874; 2 Comp.1888 § 2961; See Mason v. 
Union Pac. Ry. Co. 24 P. 796 (Utah 1890) (finding that Utah's wrongful 
death statute created a new cause of action in the heirs to pursue a 
7
 This Act gave the Power to "[t]he governor, the secretary of state, and 
the attorney general constitute a board of examiners, with power to 
examine all claims against the State." Id. at 504 
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claim of negligence on behalf of the deceased if the negligence caused 
his death). Unlike the procedural statute, 1898 Revised Statutes of 
Utah § 929, this statute was in effect at the time of the adoption of the 
Utah Constitution. 
Historically, common law gave a person injured without fault a 
right to recover from the person or corporation whose negligence or 
wrongful act produced injury, and, if death ensued from such negligence 
or wrongful act, the statute gives his heirs a right of action to recover 
compensation from the same person or corporation for the injury in 
consequence of his death. Id, at 797. If a cause of action existed for 
negligent acts against a government entity at the adoption of the Utah 
Constitution, then with this statute a cause of action existed at the time 
the constitution was adopted against the governmental entity for 
wrongful death. 
Accordingly, any statute that abrogates this right, as does the 
governmental immunity act as applied to Ms. Whitney, is 
unconstitutional pursuant to Article XVI § 5 of the Utah Constitution. 
With the enactment of "Lord Campbell's Act," the question turns from 
was there a cause of action against a governmental entity for wrongful 
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death, to was there a cause of action for negligence against the 
governmental entity at the time of the enactment of the constitution. 
This question is unequivocally and resoundingly YES. 
See Thomas v. Springville City, 35 P. 503 (Utah 1894) 
(government liable for negligent maintenance of a bridge where plaintiff 
was injured); Hopkins v. Ogden City, 16 P. 596 (Utah 1888) 
(government was negligent when horse fell through a break in a water 
pipe); Yearance v. Salt Lake City, 24 P. 254 (Utah 1890); (government 
negligently placed bricks across a walkway, which injured plaintiff); 
Levy v. Salt Lake City, 16 P. 598, 604 (Utah 1887) (government is liable 
for injuries caused through its neglect to keep in proper repair a ditch 
constructed over private property); Tucker v. Salt Lake City, 37 P. 261 
(Utah 1894) (government was negligent when it built a steep grade 
sidewalk that caused plaintiff to fall and break her arm). 
Further, even after the enactment of the procedural statute, 1898 
Revised Statutes of Utah § 929, courts continued to hear cases against 
governmental entities for negligence. See, Lowe v. Salt Lake City, 44 P. 
1050 (Utah 1896) (government was negligent when Plaintiff fell into a 
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hatchway behind city hall); Dwyer v. Salt Lake City, 57 P. 535 (Utah 
1899) (government was negligent for not maintaining street). 
Because negligence was a cause of action against a governmental 
entity when the Utah Constitution was adopted; and because the 
wrongful death statute was enacted prior to the adoption of the 
Constitution; and because the wrongful death statute applied to every 
case of negligence; a cause of action for wrongful death existed at the 
time the Utah Constitution was adopted. The Governmental Immunity 
Act abrogated that existing cause of action for wrongful death; therefore 
the Governmental Immunity Act is unconstitutional as applied in this 
case. 
* * * 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Ms. Whitney respectfully request that 
this Supreme Court of Utah, uphold the district court of Utah's findings 
and conclusions of law and find that Dillon Whitney was not 
incarcerated in a place of legal confinement, or in the alternative find 
the Governmental Immunity act is unconstitutional as applied to Ms. 
Whitney. 
Respectfully submitted this 10 day of July 2011. 
STRIEPER LAW FIRM 
ROBERT D.STRIEPER 
2366 Logan Way 
Salt Lake City, UT 84108 
Phone: 801-631-6421 
Robert@strieperlaw.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee 
30 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this Iff day of June 2011, I mailed via 
first class postage prepaid two copies of the foregoing Brief and on CD 
exact copy of the hard copies submitted, to the Clerk of the Supreme 
Court of Utah to the following: 
Bridget K. Romano 
Assistant Utah Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
PO box 140856 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0856 
7 
tobert Strieper 
2366 Logan Way 





Case 2:09-cv-00030-DAK-PMW Document 84-2 Filed 12/15/2009 Page 1 of 10 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
DONNA WHITNEY and DESTRY 
WHITNEY, individually and as parents 




DEPARTMENT OF JUVENILE 
JUSTICE SERVICES, a subdivision of 
the State of Utah; UTAH 
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN 
SERVICES, a subdivision of the State of 
Utah, STATE OF UTAH; QUEST 
YOUTH SERVICES, LLC, a Utah 
corporation; KYLE LANCASTER, DAN 
MALDONADO, JASON KAUFUSI; 
HENRY KAUFUSI; and DOES 1-10, 
Defendants. 
This matter is before the court on (1) a Motion to Dismiss filed by the State of Utah, the 
Department of Juvenile Justice Services, and the Utah Department of Human Services 
(collectively referred to as "the State Defendants"); (2) Plaintiff Donna Whitney and Destry 
Whitneys's ("Plaintiffs") Motion for Certification to the Utah Supreme Court; and (3) Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint.1 A hearing was held on August 26, 
1
 On October 17, 2009, Plaintiff Destry Whitney, Dillon's Whitney's father, filed a 
Stipulation of Dismissal, dismissing with prejudice his claims against all Defendants. See 
Docket #73. The court entered an Order dismissing Mr. Whitney's claims on November 6,2009. 
See Docket #79. Therefore, only Donna Whitney's claims remain against the Defendants, 
although the court will refer to "Plaintiffs" throughout this Memorandum Decision and Order. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER 
Case No. 2:09CV30DAK 
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2009. At the hearing, Plaintiffs were represented by Robert D. Strieper. The State Defendants 
were represented by Joni J. Jones, and Defendants Quest Youth Services, Jason Kaufusi, and 
Henry Kaufusi were represented by James C. Lewis. The court has carefully considered the 
memoranda and other materials submitted by the parties. Since taking the matter under 
advisement, the court has further considered the law and facts relating to this motion. The court 
has also considered Plaintiffs' Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition, which was filed on 
August 28, 2009, and the State Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs Supplemental 
Memorandum, which was filed on September 8, 2009. Now being fully advised, the court 
renders the following Memorandum Decision and Order. 
I. PLAINTIFFS' ALLEGATIONS2 
Sixteen-year-old Dillon Whitney was charged with several crimes from late 2006 through 
early 2007. As a result of Dillon's delinquent conduct, the Honorable Andrew A. Valdez placed 
Dillon on Probation and within the care and custody of the Department of Juvenile Justice 
Services ("DJJS") for placement in a wilderness diversion program with Journey Ranch. 
On June 5, 2007 Dillon became separated and lost for five hours during an overnight 
"trek" with Journey Ranch. Journey Ranch, believing Dillon was an unauthorized leave risk, or 
an "AWOL risk," recommended that Dillon be removed from Journey to be placed in a more 
"secure facility" where he could be "under surveillance at all times." On June 9, 2007 Dillon was 
removed from Journey and placed in custody at the Salt Lake Valley detention center. 
On June 22, 2007, Judge Valdez ordered Dillon, who was still in the care and custody of 
2
 When deciding a Motion to Dismiss, the court is required to accept as true the 
allegations in Plaintiffs' Complaint. The allegations set forth below are merely allegations and 
may or may not be factually accurate. 
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DJJS, to be followed by DJJS for observation and assessment, with ultimate plans for DJJS to 
arrange a community-based placement. On August 15, 2007, Judge Valdez, based upon the 
advice of individuals at DJJS, ordered DJJS to place Dillon in a community-based placement. 
On August 15, 2007, DJJS entrusted Jason Kaufusi ("J. Kaufusi") of Quest Youth 
Services ("Quest") to place Dillon in a safe and secure proctor home and to track Dillon's 
progress. J. Kaufusi placed Dillon at the "proctor home" of his brother, Proctor Henry Kaufusi 
("Proctor H. Kaufusi"). According to Plaintiffs, DJJS's employees lost track and control of 
Dillon after he was placed in the proctor home. On three separate occasions in early September 
2007, a caseworker attempted to contact Dillon, but failed to make contact after being given the 
excuse by J. Kaufusi that "it is hard to get hold of him [Dillon] after school." 
On September 12, 2007, Dillon had a hearing for a joyriding offense. During this 
hearing, a DJJS representative met with and informed Dillon that he would have a new 
caseworker "within a month or so." On September 25, 2007 a DJJS representative informed J. 
Kaufusi that Dillon would be assigned a new caseworker on October 6, 2007. On October 18, 
2007, the new caseworker telephoned J. Kaufusi to introduce himself. On October 30, 2007, 
Dillon learned of his new caseworker when J. Kaufusi arranged the meeting and introduced the two. 
On November 16, 2007, the new caseworker met with Dillon for a second-and last-time to provide 
Dillon with his contact information. 
During the November 16, 2007 visit, the caseworker decided that Dillon was ready for home 
visitations and motioned the court to approve them. That same day, Judge Valdez approved the 
home visits based upon the caseworker's motion. The caseworker informed J. Kaufusi about the 
order approving home visits, and the caseworker said he would approve the homevisits as long as 
3 
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Dillon continued to do well in his placement. The caseworker also informed J. Kaufusi that he could 
make the determination on home visits as long as J. Kaufusi kept the caseworker updated. 
Subsequently, J. Kaufusi approved a home visit for Thanksgiving Day, November 22, 2007, and 
Friday, November 23, 2007, until 9:00 P.M. 
On Friday, November 23, 2007, Proctor H. Kaufiisi twice called his brother, J. Kaufusi, at 
Quest to inform him that Dillon had not returned home. J. Kaufusi, who was in St. George, Utah for 
the weekend, made one futile attempt to notify Dillon's dad, Destry Whitney, that Dillon was AWOL 
and had not returned to the proctor's home. J. Kaufusi also stated that he had left a message on the 
caseworker's phone telling him that Dillon was AWOL, having not yet returned to the proctor 
home. 
On Saturday, November 24, 2007, an AWOL Dillon and some friends were at the 
apartment of Victor Hernandez. At some point, Dillon fell down a flight of seventeen stairs at 
Mr. Hernandez's apartment. Dillon's friends and Mr. Hernandez helped Dillon get back to Mr. 
Hernandez's apartment and placed Dillon on a couch. The following day, Mr. Hernandez, 
believing Dillon had died, put Dillon out in the stairwell. On Sunday, November 25, 2007, 
someone discovered Dillon in the stairwell and called paramedics, who arrived at around 7:00 
A.M. Dillon Whitney died en-route to Salt Lake Regional Hospital as a result of blunt force 
trauma to his head. 
According to Plaintiffs, during the time Dillon was missing, no one from the State of 
Utah, DJJS, or Quest searched for him or reported him missing to any authority who could locate 
him, as authorized by Utah Law U.C.A. §62A-7-104(10)(a). Also, Plaintiffs claim that the 
proctor home consisted of a basement and upstairs. Proctor H. Kaufusi and his two children 
4 
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lived upstairs while the basement was converted to house the proctored children. Dillon was 
placed in the basement of the proctor home with one other proctored child. Allegedly, Proctor 
H. Kaufusi allowed the proctored children to come and go at will, and Plaintiffs allege that he 
allowed the proctored children to violate their respective court orders, the laws of the State of 
Utah, and the policy and procedures of DJJS. 
II. THE PENDING MOTIONS 
In this lawsuit, Plaintiffs have sued Defendants on various negligence theories generally 
stemming from an alleged breach of their duty to ensure that Dillon was in a secure, controlled 
environment, and for civil rights violations under a 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
The State Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss the § 1983 claims and the negligence 
claims against them. Specifically, the State Defendants seek dismissal of the 1983 claims 
because the State is not a "person" under § 1983. The State Defendants also seek dismissal of 
the negligence claims against them because, they argue, under the Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act, immunity is not waived for negligence if the alleged negligence arises out of one's 
incarceration. Therefore, the State Defendants argue, the "incarceration exception" to the general 
waiver of immunity for negligence precludes Plaintiffs' negligence claims. 
Plaintiffs, however, argue that Dillon was not "incarcerated," and, thus, the incarceration 
exception does not apply in this case. They also argue that the Utah Governmental Immunity Act 
is unconstitutional for a variety of reasons. Alternatively, Plaintiffs argue that, to the extent the 
court finds ambiguity concerning whether the incarceration exception would apply in these 
circumstances, the court should certify this question to the Utah Supreme Court. Plaintiffs have 
5 
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also filed a Second Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint. 
III. DISCUSSION 
A. STATE DEFENDANTS5 MOTION TO DISMISS 
1. § 1983 Claims 
The State Defendants first argue that they are not persons for purposes of Section 1983, 
and therefore, the civil rights claims against them must be dismissed. "Neither the state, nor a 
governmental entity that is an arm of the state for Eleventh Amendment purposes, nor a state 
official who acts in his or her official capacity, is a "person" within the meaning of § 1983." 
Harris v. Champion, 51 F.3d 901, 905-06 (10th Cir. 1995). The court agrees, and Plaintiffs do 
not dispute, that the § 1983 claims against the State Defendants must be dismissed. 
2. Negligence Claims 
The State Defendants contend that Plaintiffs' negligence claims are barred by the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act ("UGIA").3 Generally, immunity from suit is waived as to any 
injury proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed within the 
scope of employment. See Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-301(4) (2008). The question presented by 
the instant motion is whether an exception to the waiver of immunity applies. The State 
Defendants claim that the "incarceration" exception applies in this case, compelling the dismissal 
of the negligence claims against them. 
The UGIA retains immunity for negligence claims if the injury <(arises out of, in 
connection with, or results from . . . incarceration of any person in any state prison, county or 
3
 There is no dispute that the State Defendants are governmental entities performing 
governmental functions. 
6 
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city jail, or other place of legal confinement" Id. § 63G-7-301(5)(j) (emphasis added). State 
Defendants rely on several Utah cases for the proposition that the incarceration exception applies 
in this case, barring the negligence claims against them. In Epting v. Utah, 546 P.2d 246, 244 
(Utah 1976), for example, plaintiffs sued the State when their mother was killed by an inmate 
who had escaped from the state prison. The inmate had escaped from a work-release program 
when he killed the plaintiffs' mother. The court held that the placing of a prisoner in a work 
release program was the exercise of a discretionary function, for which defendants enjoyed 
immunity. As to the incarceration exception, the court also observed: 
As to the status of [the inmate] vis-a-vis Defendants' prison, there 
seems to be just two alternatives, either: (a) he had totally escaped 
the control of the prison and was thus acting on his own so the 
prison was not responsible for him; or (b) he was still under the 
control of the prison authorities so that his conduct would "arise 
out of the incarceration of any person in (the) state prison . . . " in 
which latter instance the prison is immune from suit under the 
statute. 
Id. at 244; Kirk v. State, 784 P.2d 1255 (Utah 1989) (applying the incarceration exception to a 
situation where a prisoner shot and injured the plaintiff during a court appearance). The court 
finds that these cases are distinguishable from the case at bar because the both Kirk and Epting 
involved individuals who were sentenced to serve time in prison and were therefore 
"incarcerated" as that term is commonly understood. 
The State Defendants also rely on Emery v. State, 483 P.2d 1296, 1297 (1971), a case in 
which the Utah Supreme Court found that the incarceration exception barred a negligence claim 
when the decedent had voluntarily admitted herself to the Utah State Hospital. While this case is 
not as easily distinguishable as Kirk and Epting, a close reading of the court's reasoning reveals 
7 
Case 2:09-cv-00030-DAK-PMW Document 84-2 Filed 12/15/2009 Page 8 of 10 
that Emery, too, is distinguishable from the instant case. In Emery, the court analyzed the statute 
pertaining to the state hospital and determined that the state hospital was a place of "legal 
confinement," even though the decedent had voluntarily requested to be admitted, because a 
specific provision in the statute that allowed for the possibility of the decedent being held against 
her will. Id. at 1297. Specifically, once a voluntary patient requested to be released, the patient 
was required to wait forty-eight hours to permit sufficient time for the superintendent of the 
hospital to file a motion with a court to prevent the release. If a court granted such a motion, 
there would be no release, and the patient could be confined against his will. Id. The court 
determined that a "voluntary" patient was as much confined as was an "involuntary" patient until 
certain steps were taken to obtain a release. Id. at 1298. Thus, the court found that the 
incarceration exception applied in that case. 
In this case, Plaintiffs argue that the incarceration exception is inapplicable because 
Dillon was not incarcerated in a legal place of confinement but was instead placed in a 
community-based program. They contend that the situation in this case is more analogous to a 
foster-care placement than to being "incarcerated." Then, they argue that Utah courts have 
repeatedly recognized valid claims against the State for negligent placement of children in foster 
care. 
Having reviewed the case law concerning the incarceration exception to the waiver of 
governmental immunity for negligence, the case law on negligence claims against the state 
pertaining to foster-care placement, and the statutory language of the Juvenile Justice Services 
statute, the court agrees with Plaintiffs that the incarceration exception to the waiver of 
governmental immunity does not apply in this case. 
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The Court of Appeals of Utah has stated that to incarcerate "is to imprison or to confine." 
Pace v. St. George City Police Dept. 2006 UT App 494, ^ 6, 153 P.3d 789, 790. (2006). 
In setting forth the laws pertaining to Juvenile Justice Services, the Utah legislature set forth that 
youth offenders are either placed in "confinement in a secure facility or supervised in the 
community." Utah Code Ann. § 62A-7-101(26) (2006 & Supp. 2008) (emphasis added). A 
"secure facility" means any facility operated by or under contract with the division, that provides 
24-hour supervision and confinement for youth offenders committed to the division for custody 
and rehabilitation. Id. § 62A-7-101(20). In contrast, a "community-based program" as defined 
by the legislature, "means a nonsecure residential or nonresidential program designated to 
supervise and rehabilitate youth offenders in the least restrictive setting, consistent with public 
safety, and designated or operated by or under contract with the division." Id. § 62A-7-101(3). 
Here, the juvenile court judge specifically chose not to confine Dillon to a secure facility 
but to place him in a community-based program, where he would be supervised and rehabilitated 
"in the least restrictive setting, consistent with public safety." Id. The court cannot conclude 
that Dillon was "incarcerated" in a place of "legal confinement" for purposes of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act. Therefore, the State Defendants are not entitled to immunity under 
the incarceration exception to the waiver of governmental immunity for negligence.4 
B. PLAINTIFFS' OTHER MOTIONS 
Plaintiffs have also requested that, if the court does not agree with their position, then the 
court should certify the issue to the Utah Supreme Court. This request is moot in light of the 
4
 Because of the court's determination on this issue, the court need not address Plaintiffs' 
arguments based on the alleged unconstitutionality of the UGIA. 
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court's determination above. 
In addition, Plaintiffs have requested leave to file a Second Amended Complaint, seeking 
to add two causes of action: Violation of Civil Rights Pursuant to Utah State Constitution Article 
I Section 7; and (2) they also seek to add the estate of Dillon Whitney as a party. 
The court will permit Plaintiffs to add the estate of Dillon Whitney as a party and will 
also permit Plaintiffs to add their civil rights claim based on the Utah Constitution. The court 
finds that the Notice of Claim was sufficient to encompass such a claim. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that 
(1) The State Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [Docket # 28] is GRANTED in part and 
DENIED in part. The claims brought against the State Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 
1983 are DISMISSED, but the negligence claims against the State Defendants remain; 
(2) Plaintiffs' Motion for Certification to the Utah Supreme Court [Docket #37] is 
DENIED AS MOOT; and 
(3) Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint [Docket #44] is 
GRANTED. 
DATED this 25th day of November, 2009. 
BY THE COURT: 
^^feXzg 
DALE A. KIMBALL 
United States District Judge 
10 
